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Abstract A sentence containing disjunction in the scope of a possibility modal,
such as Angie is allowed to buy the boat or the car, gives rise to the FREE CHOICE
inference that Angie can freely choose between the two. This inference poses a
well-known puzzle, in that it is not predicted by a standard treatment of modals
and disjunction (e.g., Kamp 1974). To complicate things further, FREE CHOICE
tends to disappear under negation: Angie is not allowed to buy the boat or the
car doesn’t merely convey the negation of free choice, but rather the stronger
DUAL PROHIBITION reading that Angie cannot buy either one. There are two main
approaches to the FREE CHOICE-DUAL PROHIBITION pattern in the literature. While
they both capture the relevant data points, they make a testable, divergent prediction
regarding the status of positive and negative sentences in a context in which Angie
can only buy one of the two objects, e.g., the boat. In particular, the implicature-
based approach (e.g., Fox 2007; Klinedinst 2007; Bar-Lev & Fox 2017) predicts that
the positive sentence is true in such a context, but associated with a false implicature,
while it predicts the negative sentence to be straightforwardly false. The alternative
approach (e.g., Aloni 2018; Goldstein 2018; Willer 2017) predicts both the positive
and negative sentences to be equally undefined. Investigating the contrast between
these sentences in such a context therefore provides a clear way to address the debate
between implicature and non-implicature accounts of FREE CHOICE. We present
an experiment aiming to do just this, the results of which present a challenge for
the implicature approach. We further discuss how the implicature approach could
in theory be developed to account for our results, based on a recent proposal by
Enguehard & Chemla (2018) on the distribution of implicatures.
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1 Introduction
A sentence containing disjunction in the scope of a possibility modal, such as (1-a),
gives rise to the so-called FREE CHOICE inference in (1-b), conveying that Angie is
allowed to buy the boat and that she is allowed to buy the car. That is, she can freely
choose between the two.
(1) a. Angie is allowed to buy the boat or the car.
b.  Angie can choose between the two FREE CHOICE
This inference poses a well-known puzzle, in that it is not predicted by standard
treatments of modals and disjunction (see Kamp 1974 and much subsequent work,
as well as Meyer 2018 for a detailed overview of the problem). To complicate things
further, FREE CHOICE tends to disappear under negation: the corresponding negative
sentence in (2-a) doesn’t merely convey the negation of free choice; rather, it conveys
the stronger DUAL PROHIBITION reading, conveying that Angie cannot buy either
one.
(2) a. Angie is not allowed to buy the boat or the car.
b.  Angie is not allowed to buy either one DUAL PROHIBITION
There are two main approaches to the FREE CHOICE-DUAL PROHIBITION pattern
in the literature, one based on deriving FREE CHOICE as an implicature, the other
encoding it in the meaning of disjunction and/or the modal. While both approaches
can account for the basic cases above as well as a variety of more complex data,
they differ with respect to a simple prediction regarding the status of sentences like
(1-a) and (2-a) in a context in which Angie can only buy one of the two objects,
e.g., the boat. In particular, the implicature approach predicts the positive case to
be a true sentence with a false implicature, while it predicts the negative case to be
straightforwardly false in such a context. The non-implicature approach, on the other
hand, predicts both cases to be equally undefined. The comparison between these
sentences in such a context therefore provides a simple way to address the debate
between implicature and non-implicature approaches to FREE CHOICE.
We report an experiment aiming to test precisely these predictions. Specifi-
cally, we investigated the interpretation of sentences like (1-a) and (2-a), comparing
them to positive and negative plain disjunctions like (3-a) and (4-a); the EXCLU-
SIVITY inference that arises from (3-a) (but not from its negation in (4-a)) is less
controversially analyzed as an implicature.
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(3) a. Angie bought the boat or the car.
b.  Angie didn’t buy both the boat and the car EXCLUSIVITY IMP
(4) a. Angie didn’t buy the boat or the car.
b.  Angie didn’t buy either one NEGATED LITERAL MEANING
The results of our experiment revealed a clear difference between the two pairs of
sentences ((1-a)/(2-a) and (3-a)/(4-a)): while the latter gave rise to an asymmetric
pattern, as predicted by the implicature approach, the former pair elicited the same
response across polarities. As we discuss below, the similarity between the positive
and negative free choice cases and the difference observed in the simple disjunction
cases are challenging for the implicature approach. We outline the challenge in detail
and briefly discuss how the implicature approach might be developed to account
for our results, based on a recent proposal by Enguehard & Chemla (2018) on the
distribution of implicatures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide further
background on the FREE CHOICE-DUAL PROHIBITION pattern and outline the two
approaches and their predictions. In Section 3, we briefly discuss some relevant pre-
vious studies. We present our experiment in Section 4, and discuss the implications
of the findings for theories of free choice, including how the implicature approach
might be further developed to account for the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Background
2.1 Free choice
As we have seen, a sentence like (1-a) and its negation in (2-a) pose a challenge
for standard treatments of modals and disjunction. To illustrate the pattern more
schematically, a configuration like (5-a) gives rise to the conjunctive FREE CHOICE
inference in (5-b). Its negation in (6-a) also gives rise to a conjunctive DUAL PRO-
HIBITION inference, which is stronger than the NEGATED FREE CHOICE inference
(which would correspond to: ¬♦B∨¬♦C).
(5) a. ♦(B∨C)
b. ♦B∧♦C FREE CHOICE
(6) a. ¬♦(B∨C)
b. ¬♦B∧¬♦C DUAL PROHIBITION
In addition, the negated free choice reading re-emerges in cases like (7), in which a
DUAL PROHIBITION reading of the first sentence would lead to a contradiction with
the continuation. The coherence of (7) indicates that the first sentence is read with a
negated free choice reading.
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(7) Angie isn’t allowed to buy the boat or the car. She’s only allowed to buy the
boat!
Relatedly, the FREE CHOICE inference can also be suspended in cases like (8), where
a FREE CHOICE reading of the first sentence would lead to a contradiction with the
second one. The coherence of (8) again tells us that the first sentence can be read as
not entailing FREE CHOICE.
(8) Angie is allowed to buy the boat or the car. I don’t remember which one.
Any approach to the FREE CHOICE-DUAL PROHIBITION pattern not only has to
predict FREE CHOICE in the positive case and DUAL PROHIBITION in the negative
one, but it also needs to account for the absence of such DUAL PROHIBITION and
FREE CHOICE readings in cases like (7) and (8), respectively.1 We turn now to the
two main approaches in the literature.
2.2 Two approaches
2.2.1 The implicature approach
The most prominent approach in the literature is based on a theory of implicatures
and comes in different versions (e.g., Fox 2007; Klinedinst 2007; Chemla 2010;
Franke 2011; Santorio & Romoli 2017; Bar-Lev 2018; Bar-Lev & Fox 2017).
Without going into the details of the implementation, this account is based on three
main ingredients: (i) a standard meaning for disjunction and possibility modals, (ii)
an implicature-generating algorithm, which we can refer to as ‘EXH’, and (iii) a(n
independently required) principle regulating the distribution of EXH, which bans or
strongly disfavors EXH under negation, as in (9) (see, among others, Chierchia, Fox
& Spector 2012 and Fox & Spector 2018).
(9) Do not insert EXH in a sentence S if the resulting meaning is weaker than
that of S, unless forced to.
Theories differ in how they conceive of and define EXH, how many EXH operators
one needs, and in which positions they must occur in order to generate FREE CHOICE.
These differences will not be important for our purposes. What is relevant for us is
that EXH gives rise to FREE CHOICE as an implicature.
To illustrate how this approach works, let us go back to the positive case in (1-a),
repeated schematically below in (10).
1 The puzzle in fact extends more generally beyond the positive/negative dichotomy to upward- versus
downward-entailing environments; see Fox (2007), among others, for discussion.
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LITERAL MEANING IMPLICATURE RESULT
POS ♦(B∨C) = ♦B∨♦C EXH(♦(B∨C)) = ♦B∧♦C ♦B∧♦C
NEG ¬♦(B∨C) = ¬♦B∧¬♦C *¬(EXH(♦(B∨C))) = ¬(♦B∧♦C) ¬♦B∧¬♦C
Table 1 Derivation of the FREE CHOICE-DUAL PROHIBITION pattern under the
implicature account.
(10) ♦(B∨C) = ♦B∨♦C LITERAL MEANING
The literal meaning of (10) does not entail FREE CHOICE; in fact it is simply
equivalent to ♦B∨♦C (there is at least one between the boat and the car that Angie
is allowed to buy).
The weak meaning in (10), when negated, immediately gives rise to the strong
DUAL PROHIBITION reading: (11) entails ¬♦B∧¬♦C (Angie is not allowed to buy
the boat and she isn’t allowed to buy the car).
(11) ¬[♦(B∨C)] = ¬♦B∧¬♦C DUAL PROHIBITION
To generate FREE CHOICE, EXH is added to the positive sentence, generating the
desired inference as an implicature.
(12) EXH[♦(B∨C)] = ♦B∧♦C FREE CHOICE
Moreover, the principle in (9) prevents, or makes it very hard for EXH to appear in
the scope of negation, which would otherwise give rise to a NEGATED FREE CHOICE
reading, (13), rather than the stronger DUAL PROHIBITION above in (11).
(13) *¬[EXH[♦(B∨C)]] = ¬♦B∨¬♦C NEGATED FREE CHOICE
The derivations of the different meanings are schematized in Table 1.
Finally, the implicature approach can also account for the absence of FREE
CHOICE and DUAL PROHIBITION in cases like (7) and (8). The latter can simply be a
case in which EXH is not added to (10), giving rise to the weaker literal meaning that
does not entail FREE CHOICE. This meaning is compatible with the continuation,
where the speaker is explicit about being ignorant as to which of the boat and the
car Angie is allowed to buy. (7) would be a case in which EXH does appear under
negation (in the formulation of (9), EXH is allowed to appear under negation even
if it leads to weakening, when this is ‘forced’ by the context). In this case, the
potentially contradictory continuation would force EXH to appear under negation,
giving rise to the NEGATED FREE CHOICE meaning in (13), which is compatible
with the rest of the sentence and can therefore account for the felicity of (7).
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In sum, given standard assumptions about the meanings of modals and dis-
junction, along with a theory of implicatures and a principle that regulates their
distribution, the implicature approach can account for the FREE CHOICE-DUAL
PROHIBITION pattern as well as cases in which these readings are absent. We turn
now to the alternative, non-implicature approach.
2.2.2 The non-implicature approach
The implicature approach is not the only theoretical option available for explaining
the FREE CHOICE-DUAL PROHIBITION pattern (see Zimmerman 2000, among
others). Recently, a variety of alternative accounts have been proposed (e.g., Starr
2016; Aloni 2018; Willer 2017; Goldstein 2018; Rothschild & Yablo 2018; Fusco
2015). For concreteness, we focus on the HOMOGENEITY account in Goldstein
(2018) (see Rothschild & Yablo 2018 for a similar proposal); as far as we can see,
however, the main points below apply to any non-implicature approach.
The HOMOGENEITY account is based on four ingredients: (i) a strong meaning
for sentences like (1-a), which directly asserts FREE CHOICE, (ii) a homogeneity
presupposition requiring that either all alternatives are possible or none of them are,
(iii) an operator that has the effect of cancelling the strong FREE CHOICE meaning,
and (iv) another operator that can suspend DUAL PROHIBITION.
To illustrate, consider the positive case in (14-a). Given (i), FREE CHOICE is
directly entailed.2 In addition, (14-a) also presupposes HOMOGENEITY, as in (14-b)
(which in this case is entailed by the asserted FREE CHOICE meaning).
(14) a. ♦(B∨C) = ♦B∧♦C FREE CHOICE
b. ♦B↔ ♦C HOMOGENEITY
While this approach directly captures FREE CHOICE by encoding it in the meaning
of the positive sentence, it fails to immediately account for DUAL PROHIBITION.
This is because in the negative case in (15-a), the asserted meaning is now simply
the negation of FREE CHOICE. However, the latter, in combination with the HOMO-
GENEITY presupposition in (15-b) (which projects through negation), gives rise to
the desired DUAL PROHIBITION reading in (15-c).
(15) a. ¬♦(B∨C) = ¬(♦B∧♦C) NEGATED FREE CHOICE
b. ♦B↔ ♦C HOMOGENEITY
c. ¬♦B∧¬♦C DUAL PROHIBITION
Finally, the HOMOGENEITY approach can capture examples like (7) and (8) by
2 See Goldstein (2018) for two possible ways of implementing this compositionally, by tweaking the
standard meaning of modals or that of disjunction.
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ASSERTED MEANING PRESUPPOSED MEANING RESULT
POSITIVE ♦(B∨C) = ♦B∧♦C ♦B↔ ♦C ♦B∧♦C
NEGATIVE ¬♦(B∨C) = ¬(♦B∧♦C) ♦B↔ ♦C ¬♦B∧¬♦C
Table 2 Derivation of the FREE CHOICE-DUAL PROHIBITION pattern under the
HOMOGENEITY account.
introducing two additional mechanisms. The first is an operator ‘!’ that has the effect
of cancelling FREE CHOICE when merged below the modal.3
(16) ♦(!(B∨C)) = ♦B∨♦C
The second is a local accommodation operator ‘A ’ (invoked independently in the
presupposition literature, see Beaver 2001 and Fox 2012, among others), which,
when merged below negation, makes the homogeneity presupposition an entailment
and prevents it from projecting. The resulting meaning is the weak one in (17).
(17) ¬[A [♦(B∨C)]] =
¬[(♦B∧♦C)∧ (♦B↔ ♦C)] =
¬[(♦B∧♦C)] = ¬♦B∨¬♦C NEGATED FREE CHOICE
In sum, combining the asserted meaning and the homogeneity presupposition, the
homogeneity approach can capture the basic pattern, as well as the suspension of the
FREE CHOICE and DUAL PROHIBITION readings (through the use of two additional
operators). Table 2 provides a schematic illustration of the derivations of the different
meanings under this approach.
2.2.3 Summary
The two theoretical approaches we have described can account for the basic FREE
CHOICE and DUAL PROHIBITION readings, as well as cases in which these readings
appear to be absent. On the empirical end of things, a variety of more complex data
points have been discussed in the literature, including free choice in the scope of
universal and negative existential quantifiers (Chemla 2009; Van Tiel 2012; Bar-
Lev & Fox 2017; Bar-Lev 2018), modified numerals (Gotzner, Romoli & Santorio
2017, to appear), different modal bases (Nouwen to appear; Bar-Lev 2018), free
choice items beyond disjunction (Chierchia 2013), the interaction between free
choice and presuppositions (Romoli & Santorio 2019; Marty & Romoli 2019), and
3 The operator ! essentially has the effect of double negation; we again refer the reader to Goldstein
(2018) for details.
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the processing of free choice (Chemla & Bott 2014) and its acquisition in young
children (Tieu, Romoli, Zhou & Crain 2016). The jury is still out on which of
the two approaches sketched above can best account for the observed empirical
landscape.4 In what follows, we will concentrate on a divergent prediction of the
two approaches.5
2.3 Predictions
The two approaches we have described make similar predictions for the basic
FREE CHOICE-DUAL PROHIBITION pattern, as well as for a variety of related data.
There is one prediction where they diverge, however, which to our knowledge has
been untested (although similar discussions exist in the context of plurals, see Križ
2015; Križ & Chemla 2015; Tieu, Bill, Romoli & Crain 2017a; Renans, Romoli,
Makri, Tieu, de Vries, Folli & Tsoulas 2018). This divergent prediction has to do
with the status of the basic positive and negative cases. In particular, recall that
under the implicature approach, FREE CHOICE arises as an implicature while DUAL
PROHIBITION is simply a part of the literal meaning.
(1-a) Angie is allowed to buy the boat or the car.
 Angie can choose between the two IMPLICATURE
(2-a) Angie is not allowed to buy the boat or the car.
 Angie cannot buy either one LITERAL MEANING
Under the homogeneity approach, on the other hand, FREE CHOICE is part of the lit-
eral meaning, while DUAL PROHIBITION arises via the homogeneity presupposition.
Crucially, under this approach, both the positive and negative cases are associated
with the same homogeneity presupposition.
(1-a) Angie is allowed to buy the boat or the car.
 Angie can buy one iff she can buy the other HOMOGENEITY
4 While the non-implicature approach can more straightforwardly account for certain observed dif-
ferences between free choice and other implicatures, it is more stipulative in nature. In particular,
while the implicature approach does not need any extra assumptions about the meanings of modals
and disjunction, the non-implicature approach needs to tweak these meanings in particular ways (see
Bar-Lev 2018, Aloni 2018, and Romoli & Santorio 2019 for discussion).
5 A third option is the account in Barker (2010), which encodes FREE CHOICE in the semantics while
deriving DUAL PROHIBITION as an implicature. This approach makes the opposite prediction of
the standard implicature approach: in a context in which Angie is only allowed to buy the boat, a
sentence like (1-a) is predicted to be false, while its negative counterpart in (2-a) is predicted to be an
implicature violation. That is, this approach predicts an asymmetry between the positive and negative
free choice cases, but in the opposite direction of the corresponding disjunction cases. As we will see
below, our results are also challenging for this kind of implicature approach.
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IMPLICATURE HOMOGENEITY
POSITIVE IMPLICATURE VIOLATION PRESUPPOSITION FAILURE
NEGATIVE FALSITY PRESUPPOSITION FAILURE
Table 3 Predictions of the implicature and homogeneity approaches for sen-
tences like (1-a) and (2-a), in contexts in which only one of the disjuncts
is true.
(2-a) Angie is not allowed to buy the boat or the car.
 Angie can buy one iff she can buy the other HOMOGENEITY
The differences in the status of the positive and negative sentences can be brought
out in a context in which only one of the disjuncts is true. To illustrate, consider
a context in which Angie is only allowed to buy the boat. In this context, the
homogeneity account predicts both the positive and negative cases to be undefined,
as their presupposition is not satisfied. The implicature account, on the other hand,
predicts a difference in status across the two polarities: it predicts the positive to be
a literally true sentence, but with a false implicature, while it predicts the negative
case to be plainly false. The predictions are summarized in Table 3.
To sharpen the intuitions, consider the comparison with the corresponding sim-
ple disjunction case: (3-a) gives rise to the exclusivity inference in (3-b), which
disappears under negation in (4-a). In a context in which Angie bought both the boat
and the car, (3-a) is predicted to be true but with a false implicature, while (4-a) is
predicted to be plainly false.
(3) a. Angie bought the boat or the car.
b.  Angie didn’t buy both the boat and the car EXCLUSIVITY IMP
(4) a. Angie didn’t buy the boat or the car.
b.  Angie didn’t buy either one NEGATED LITERAL MEANING
We can state the predictions as follows: the implicature approach predicts a similar
pattern for the pairs in (1-a)/(2-a) and (3-a)/(4-a), reflecting a false implicature in
the positive cases and a false literal meaning in the negative cases. The homogeneity
account, on the other hand, is compatible with a difference between the pairs, in that
(1-a) and (2-a), unlike (3-a) and (4-a), are predicted to have the same status (they
are both predicted to be undefined). These predictions can be recast as in Table 4.
Quantitatively, observing a statistical interaction between Inference Type
(EXCLUSIVITY vs. FREE CHOICE) and Polarity (positive vs. negative) would present
a challenge for the implicature approach, but would be entirely in line with the ho-
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DISJUNCTION FREE CHOICE (IMP) FREE CHOICE (HOM)
POS IMP VIOLATION IMP VIOLATION PRESUPPOSITION FAILURE
NEG FALSITY FALSITY PRESUPPOSITION FAILURE
Table 4 Predictions of the implicature and homogeneity approaches for sen-
tences like (1-a)/(2-a) and (3-a)/(4-a), in contexts in which only one of
the disjuncts is true.
mogeneity approach. Testing these predictions gives us a simple way to distinguish
between the two theoretical approaches. Before turning to our experiment, we will
briefly outline some previous studies that the experiment builds upon.
3 Previous studies
In recent years, a variety of studies have used a ternary judgment task to investigate
implicatures (Katsos & Bishop 2011; Tieu et al. 2017a; Renans et al. 2018), pre-
suppositions (Abrusan & Szendroi 2013), and homogeneity (Križ & Chemla 2015;
Tieu, Kriz & Chemla 2019). As first conceived of in Katsos & Bishop (2011) for
implicatures, the idea behind the ternary judgment task is that the lowest valued
judgment (e.g., the smallest reward) is reserved for false sentences, the highest val-
ued judgment (e.g., the biggest reward) is reserved for true and felicitous sentences,
and the intermediate judgment is meant for true but infelicitous sentences, e.g.,
sentences with a true literal meaning but a false implicature.
Tieu et al. (2017a) made use of such a ternary judgment task to investigate the
comprehension of plural noun phrases, comparing the multiplicity inference of bare
plurals to the exclusivity inference of disjunction. In their study, participants saw
pictures of cartoon characters deciding what to buy at the store, and heard a puppet’s
guesses as to what would or wouldn’t happen (the so-called ‘prediction’ mode of
the judgment task; see Tieu, Yatsushiro, Cremers, Romoli, Sauerland & Chemla
2017b, among others). Participants then saw the outcome and had to decide whether
to reward the puppet with a small, medium, or large strawberry.
In particular, on the disjunction trials, participants heard positive and negative
sentences such as (18) and (19), in contexts in which both disjuncts turned out to
be true; for example, Tiger ended up buying both the apple and the banana, leaving
behind a third object.
(18) Tiger will buy the apple or the banana.
(19) Tiger will not buy the apple or the banana.
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In the target context in which both disjuncts turn out to be true, the positive (18)
is a true sentence with a false implicature, while its negative counterpart in (19) is
plainly false. Participants were therefore expected to select the intermediate reward
for (18), and the minimal reward corresponding to plain falsity for (19).
The results indeed revealed a clear contrast between plain falsity and implicature
violation. Participants favored the intermediate reward for the positive targets,
and gave mostly minimal rewards for the negative targets. This is in line with an
implicature approach to the exclusivity inference, with participants mapping the
intermediate reward to implicature violation and the minimal reward to falsity. This
result is important because it provides a baseline against which to compare other
phenomena that have also been subjected to an implicature analysis; indeed, Tieu
et al. (2017a) compared the pattern of exclusivity inferences with that of multiplicity
inferences in order to investigate the implicature approach to plurality. We will use
the same logic in the present study, comparing the implicature of disjunction to the
free choice inference.
4 Experiment
We used a 2 × 2 design with Inference Type (free choice vs. disjunction, between
subjects) and Polarity (positive vs. negative, within subjects) as factors.
4.1 Methods
4.1.1 Participants
114 participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and randomly
assigned to the free choice (FC) or disjunction (OR) condition; three were excluded
for not reporting English as a native language, leaving 111 participants for analysis
(56 FC, 55 OR). Participants were paid $.75 USD for the 5-minute study.
4.2 Procedure
Participants completed a ternary judgment task in prediction mode, implemented
in Qualtrics. They had to read a puppet’s guesses about what a character was
allowed/not allowed to buy (FC condition) or about what a character bought/didn’t
buy (OR condition). Participants then had to decide upon seeing the outcome
whether the puppet ought to receive a small strawberry (described in the instructions
as corresponding to ‘totally wrong’ guesses), a large strawberry (‘totally right’), or
a medium-sized strawberry (‘in between, not totally right but not totally wrong’).
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Figure 1 Example visual stimuli for FC and OR targets: the image on the left was
paired with the positive and negative FC targets in (1-a) and (2-a); the
image on the right was paired with the positive and negative OR targets
in (3-a) and (4-a).
Participants indicated their response by clicking on the button that had the desired
reward on it.
4.2.1 Materials
Objects that were ‘allowed’ (FC condition) or bought (OR condition) were visually
represented in a green circle; objects that were ‘disallowed’ (FC condition) or were
not bought (OR condition) were represented with a red circle with a line across it.
In the FC condition, the critical positive and negative target sentences (e.g., (1-a)
and (2-a), repeated below) were presented in contexts such as Figure 1 [left], in
which only one of the disjuncts was ‘allowed’ (i.e. Angie was only allowed to buy
the boat).
(1-a) Angie is allowed to buy the boat or the car.
(2-a) Angie is not allowed to buy the boat or the car.
In the OR condition, the positive and negative target sentences (e.g., (3-a) and (4-a),
repeated below) were presented in contexts like Figure 1 [right], which made false
the exclusivity inference (i.e. Angie bought both the boat and the car).
(3-a) Angie bought the boat or the car.
(4-a) Angie didn’t buy the boat or the car.
In addition to the target items, participants received clearly true and clearly false
(positive and negative) control items; see Figure 2 for the FC controls and Figure 3
for the OR controls.
In total, participants received 2 training items, followed by 8 targets (4 positive,
4 negative) and 8 controls (2 true and 2 false positive controls, 2 true and 2 false
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POSITIVE NEGATIVE
TRUE
FALSE
Figure 2 Example visual stimuli for FC controls: (1-a) was paired with the top-
left image to create a positive true control, and with the bottom-left
image to create a positive false control. (2-a) was paired with the top-
right image to create a negative true control, and with the bottom-right
image to create a negative false control.
POSITIVE NEGATIVE
TRUE
FALSE
Figure 3 Example visual stimuli for OR controls: (3-a) was paired with the top-
left image to create a positive true control, and with the bottom-left
image to create a positive false control. (4-a) was paired with the top-
right image to create a negative true control, and with the bottom-right
image to create a negative false control.
negative ones). Every picture/context contained three objects, to avoid any infelicity
associated with using disjunction in a context with only two objects.6
6 See Skordos, Feiman, Bale & Barner (2018) for discussion of potential infelicities associated with
the use of disjunction in certain experimental contexts.
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Figure 4 Proportion of each reward type selected in response to free choice and
disjunction targets.
4.3 Results
As can be seen in Figure 4, participants primarily gave the intermediate reward in
response to both positive and negative FC targets, while they gave an asymmetric
pattern of responses to the positive and negative OR targets. We fitted a mixed effects
cumulative link model to responses to the targets with Inference Type, Polarity,
and their interaction as fixed effects, and random by-participant slopes for Polarity.
Model comparisons between the maximal model and those without each of the
fixed effects revealed a marginal effect of Inference Type (χ2(1) = 3.2, p= .07), a
significant effect of Polarity (χ2(1) = 102, p< .001), and a significant interaction
between Inference Type and Polarity (χ2(1) = 88, p < .001), with participants
showing a greater difference between polarities for OR than for FC.
Figure 5 displays the results for the FC and OR controls. Participants’ responses
to the controls were mostly as expected, with maximal rewards for true controls
and minimal rewards for false controls. In the disjunction condition, however, the
positive true and negative false controls elicited a relatively large proportion of
intermediate responses. These intermediate responses are surprising: in the positive
case, the context was one in which Angie bought only the boat, thus (3-a) should
have been judged as clearly true, and in the negative case, the same context was
paired with (4-a), which therefore should have been judged as clearly false.
The intermediate responses in these cases could be related to participants’ prefer-
ences regarding the scope of disjunction relative to negation, or to potential residual
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Figure 5 Proportion of each reward type selected in response to free choice and
disjunction control items.
effects of the ignorance inference of disjunction (despite our best efforts to make
the disjunction felicitous by presenting the sentences in prediction mode). These
factors should be investigated more carefully in future research. What is relevant
for present purposes is that participants treated the controls differently from the free
choice targets, and so at least at first glance, whatever factors are playing a role in
the former can’t fully explain participants’ performance on the latter.
4.4 Discussion
The observed difference between the free choice and disjunction targets, and in
particular the observed interaction between Inference Type and Polarity, is chal-
lenging for the implicature account, which predicts a similar pattern for the two
sentence types, across polarities. On the other hand, the results are straightforwardly
in line with the homogeneity account, which predicts (1-a) and (2-a) to be equally
undefined in the given context, and is compatible with the observed interaction
between Inference Type and Polarity.
Note that a response to the challenge against the implicature account cannot
lie (entirely) in a ‘scalar diversity’ effect (van Tiel, van Miltenburg, Zevakhina &
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Geurts 2016). That is, the observed interaction cannot be explained by appealing
to a relative difference in the strength of the free choice and exclusivity inferences.
This line of explanation would at most be able to account for the difference observed
in the positive condition, but would be silent about the difference observed in the
negative condition.7 We turn next to a promising direction that might be able to
account for the negative condition.
4.5 A possible solution to the challenge
As mentioned, it is not clear how one might address the challenge to the implicature
approach by appealing to the notion of scalar diversity, or to a difference in the
alternatives involved in computing free choice and exclusivity. A possible alter-
native direction would be to reconsider the principle regulating the distribution of
implicatures.
To illustrate, consider the standard principle in (9), which strongly disfavors the
appearance of EXH in the scope of negation. As with our examples, the presence
of EXH in the scope of negation weakens the meaning of the overall sentence and
is thus blocked. Consider now what would happen if we were to lift the ban in
(9): we could then parse the negative (2-a), repeated below, as in (20). The latter is
associated with the weaker NEGATED FREE CHOICE meaning, ¬♦C∨¬♦B, which
is true in the given target context (Angie doesn’t have free choice, as she can only
buy the boat).
(2-a) Angie is not allowed to buy the boat or the car.
(20) not[EXH[Angie is allowed to buy the boat or the car]]
= not[Angie can choose between the two] NEGATED FC
If (20) were a viable option, then (2-a) could be associated with a true reading in
the context (in addition to that in (21) without EXH, which would give rise to a false
meaning instead, as seen above).
(21) not[Angie is allowed to buy the boat or the car] DUAL PROHIBITION
On the basis of this, one might hypothesize that the reason people gave intermediate
responses to the negative FC targets was that the target sentences were associated
with two different readings, one true and one false, resulting in an intermediate status
(see Bill, Romoli & Schwarz 2018 for a similar idea in relation to response times
7 The nature of the alternatives involved in inference computation has been argued to play a role in
observed differences between free choice and other inferences, in processing and acquisition (Chemla
& Bott 2014; Tieu et al. 2016); however, it is not clear to us how appealing to alternatives would be
able to account for the present data.
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associated with scalar implicatures and presuppositions).
The problem with this line of explanation is that it readily extends to the negative
disjunction case in (4-a), repeated below. This is because the latter could also be
analyzed as in (22), giving rise to a weaker meaning, ¬B∨¬C, which is true in the
given context.
(4-a) Angie didn’t buy the boat or the car.
(22) not[EXH[Angie bought the boat or the car]]
not[Angie bought the boat or the car but not both] NEGATED EXCL
Therefore, simply abandoning the principle in (9) would not allow us to account for
the difference between the free choice and disjunction conditions (not to mention the
fact that it would leave us without an explanation for the distribution of implicatures).
What’s needed is to replace (9) with a principle that still disallows EXH under
negation in cases like (4-a), but allows it in cases like (2-a). A recent proposal in the
literature, Enguehard & Chemla (2018), has independently argued for a principle
that achieves exactly this. Enguehard & Chemla (2018) argue that the standard
formulation in (9) based on logical strength should be replaced by a constraint based
on a notion of ‘connectedness,’ a logical notion related to monotonicity. Roughly,
the principle in (23) makes a parse strongly dispreferred if it doesn’t give rise to a
connected meaning.
(23) Among the parses of a sentence (with or without EXH), those that result in
non-connected meanings are dispreferred/marked.
Formal details aside (for which we refer the reader to Enguehard & Chemla 2018),
what is relevant here is that this proposal differs from the standard one precisely in
that it predicts EXH not to be banned in the scope of negation with FREE CHOICE,
while still predicting the standard asymmetry between positive and negative in the
case of simple disjunction.8 Their argument is that it would intuitively be easier to
force a NEGATED FREE CHOICE reading as in (24), than the corresponding negated
exclusivity meaning in (25).9
8 This is the case only if an anti-conjunctive inference is not derived (see Enguehard & Chemla 2018).
9 Both are actually possible with marked intonation, but the claim is that (24) is possible and relatively
easy without such an intonation. As Enguehard & Chemla (2018) discuss, their proposal doesn’t
account for why the negated free choice reading in (24), while possibly easier to access than
the corresponding negated exclusivity reading, is intuitively still more difficult than the DUAL
PROHIBITION reading in (i).
(i) Angie is not allowed to buy the boat or the car.
 Angie is not allowed to buy either one DUAL PROHIBITION
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(24) Angie is not allowed to buy the boat or the car. She’s only allowed to buy
the boat!
(25) Angie didn’t buy the boat or the car. She bought both!
The intuitive difference between (24) and (25) is in line with what we observed in
our experiment, in particular with respect to the comparison between the negative
free choice and disjunction conditions. Under this hypothesis, participants would
have found it easier to read the negative FC targets with an embedded EXH than to
do the same for the corresponding negative OR targets. As a result, the former had a
true reading in the context, and consequently led participants to choose the medium
strawberry. This proposal presents a promising direction for making the implicature
approach compatible with our results (perhaps in combination with considerations
of scalar diversity, to account for the difference in the positive conditions).
5 Conclusion and further directions
A sentence containing disjunction in the scope of a possibility modal, such as Angie
is allowed to buy the boat or the car, gives rise to the FREE CHOICE inference
that Angie can freely choose between the two. As is well known, this inference
is puzzling for standard treatments of modals and disjunction (Kamp 1974). In
addition, and to complicate things further, FREE CHOICE tends to disappear under
negation: Angie is not allowed to buy the boat or the car doesn’t merely convey
the negation of free choice, but rather the stronger DUAL PROHIBITION reading
that Angie cannot buy either one. There are two main approaches to this pattern in
the literature, including one based on implicature. While both the implicature and
non-implicature approaches cover the basic pattern and more complicated related
data points, they diverge in what they predict for the status of positive and negative
sentences in certain contexts. In this paper, we presented an experiment testing these
predictions, the results of which present a challenge for the implicature approach
but are more straightforwardly in line with the homogeneity approach. At a more
general level, our results are consistent with previous findings in the literature of
crucial differences between free choice and implicatures, e.g., in their processing
and acquisition profiles (Chemla & Bott 2014; Tieu et al. 2016).
One could take our results as providing support for a non-implicature approach;
alternatively, the findings might encourage us to refine the implicature approach,
by reconsidering, for instance, the principle regulating the distribution of the EXH
operator. Regardless of the theoretical choice pursued, empirically investigating the
relative status of the positive and negative sentences provides a useful way to address
the debate between implicature and non-implicature approaches to free choice. Such
comparative investigations may also prove fruitful for better understanding a variety
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of other phenomena at the semantics-pragmatics interface.
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